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CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SHARED MENTAL MODELS
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Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
Elizabeth Blickensderfer
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
An interest in cognitive skill is beginning to appear in relation to crew resource management.  One aspect of
cognitive skill that has been examined in a variety of team domains is the notion of overlapping or “shared” mental
models among teammates.  While a growing amount of evidence on the relationship between shared mental models
and team performance exists, only limited research has occurred in respect to the role shared mental models have in
crew resource management.  The purpose of this paper is to provide researchers and practitioners an understanding
of shared mental models and their role in team performance, and to encourage additional research on this topic
within the aviation domain.
Introduction
Human error is a major factor in aviation accidents.
As a result, pilot training has shifted from an
emphasis on purely technical skills to a combination
of both technical and teamwork skills (Flin, 1997;
Reynolds & Rhoades, 2004). These training
programs have a variety of names, but the most
common is Crew Resource Management (CRM).
CRM is currently required by all 185 International
Civil Aviation Organization members, is
incorporated into each of the US military branches,
and is gaining steady support outside aviation in
industries as diverse as nuclear power producers and
medical practitioners (American Psychological
Association, 2005; Flin, Meams, & O’Connor, 2002).
Bowers and Salas (2003) note that traditional CRM has
two goals: a) to create more positive attitudes to increase
the likelihood of coordination and (b) to practice the
necessary skills.  Typically, three main skill clusters are
targeted: communication, team building and workload
management. Within these broad categories, however,
content may vary to include: adaptability, assertiveness,
communication, decision-making, leadership, mission
analysis, situational awareness, forward planning, risk
assessment, prioritization skills, delegation, group
dynamics, stress and coping techniques, and how to
monitor automated equipment (Driskell & Adams,
1992; Naval Education and Training Command, 2003).
In the following sections, we begin by discussing the
history  of  CRM,  as  well  as  some  of  the  current
research focusing on the future of CRM.  We then
discuss one aspect of effective team performance,
implicit communication, and show how implicit
communication can be fostered through the
development of shared mental models.  We conclude
by suggesting that future work on CRM incorporate
shared mental model research.
History of CRM
Kern (2001) suggests that the roots of CRM can be
found in a 1951 U.S. Air Force Inspector General’s
report which analyzed data from 7518 major
accidents between 1948 and 1951, and found that
poor teamwork and human errors caused the majority
of aircraft accidents.   By the 1970’s, the Federal
Aviation  Administration,  the  US  Air  Force,  and  the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration had
programs under development that focused on
reducing human error in aviation.  Simultaneously,
several commercial carriers were also developing
training programs, focusing on crew coordination and
communication (Flin, 1997). In 1978, a United
Airlines DC-8 crashed into a suburb of Portland,
Oregon.  As a result of this accident, in 1980, United
Airlines set up a formal training program (known as
Cockpit Resource Management) to focus on human
factors in aviation, and pioneered the first generation
of CRM (Boser, 1997).
A few of these first generation programs incorporated
simulator flights into training, but many programs
involved games and exercises unrelated to aviation.
Although there was acceptance of some aspects of
the  training,  many  pilots  dismissed  CRM  as
manipulation of their personalities or derided it as
“charm school” (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm,
2001). According to these same authors, the next
evolution of CRM focused on mission effectiveness
in more specific environments, flight deck
automation, and a broader perspective of cockpit
resources, including everyone in the organization and
air traffic controllers. Although aviators accepted this
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second  generation  of  CRM  more  readily  than  the
first, many still scoffed at it as “psycho-babble.”
Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm (2001) suggest that
the early 1990s marked the advent of the third
generation  of  CRM.   By  then,  most  airlines  had
integrated CRM into training, and extended the
application of CRM to include maintenance crews
and  cabin  crews.   The  fourth  generation  of  CRM
stemmed from an FAA decision in 1990 to
implement the Advanced Qualification Program
(AQP).   As  a  part  of  this  program,  airlines  were
required to produce detailed training programs for
each aircraft model, and incorporate the relevant
human factors issues into each module.
Currently, the trend in CRM is to focus on error
management training, in which participants are
explicitly encouraged to make errors and learn from
them, rather than adopt an error avoidant approach
(Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag & Keith, 2003; Keith
& Frese, 2005). Petrilli and Thomas (2004) point out
that this model requires three new critical
developments: a greater requirement to focus on
cognitive skill development, a requirement to better
integrate technical and non-technical skills in
decision making, and a requirement to better prepare
aviators by increasing the experiential component of
error management training.
The Future of CRM
Much of the current research on CRM either
explicitly or implicitly recommends incorporating
knowledge from other bodies of work, especially
teamwork and cognitive skills, into CRM training.
For example, a focus on cognitive skill development
as an important aspect of CRM was emphasized in
recent work by Keith and Frese (2005). They
investigated self-regulatory processes in error
management training, and found that volunteers who
learned a computer program using error management
training, or error management training supplemented
with a metacognitive module, performed better than
those using error avoidant training.
Alonso, et al., (2006) discussed the development of
two  CRM  programs  for  the  Department  of  Defense
military health system, and noted that a recent
evaluation of the programs identified several
limitations, including the failure to incorporate the
larger body of team training research.  Similarly, a
systematic debriefing method, based on existing team
performance research outside the CRM domain, was
an element added by Prince, Salas, Brannick, and
Orasanu (2005) in order to address one of the
weaknesses of CRM. A research area so far neglected
by the CRM community, however, is that of implicit
coordination and shared mental models.
Implicit Coordination
A team’s ability to adjust its strategy and react
appropriately is crucial in fast-paced, stressful
environments. Researchers have argued that implicit
coordination is the mechanism that helps teams to
adapt and adjust (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989).
Espinosa, Lerch, and Kraut (2004) are referring to
implicit communication when they discuss “…high-
paced contexts like sports competitions and medical
emergency rooms in which members act in a highly
coordinated fashion with very little communication
because of their prior experience working and/or
training together.” Evans, Harper, and Jentsch (2004)
also imply implicit communication when they state
“The most commonly used example of this type of
effort is the ‘no-look’ pass performed between
basketball teammates. This task requires that
teammates not only anticipate a pass but know when
and where to anticipate either their teammate being
or the pass coming from.”
Implicit coordination occurs when team members
work together effectively without overt strategizing
or other communication.  This occurs because team
members know their respective duties, how to
compensate for other team members, what
information or materials they must provide to other
team members, and when to provide it.  Authors have
stressed that teams whose members anticipate what
information, materials, or assistance their teammates
will need and, in turn, give those in advance of their
teammates’ requests, tend to perform better than
those teams whose members do not anticipate what
will be needed by their teammates (Entin, Serfaty, &
Deckert, 1994; Krumm & Farina, 1962; Volpe,
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 1996).
The shared mental models construct has been adopted
by a number of team researchers as the mechanism
which allows successful teams to coordinate and have
smooth, implicit coordination (Cannon-Bowers,
Salas, & Converse, 1993; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997;
Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 2005; Rentsch & Hall, 1994).
Shared Mental Models
The shared mental model concept stems from the
concept of mental models, or knowledge organization
that allows humans to interact effectively with their
environment by organizing knowledge into
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meaningful patterns. In reviews of work considering
the purpose of mental models, the common themes of
description, explanation, and prediction appear.
(Rasmussen, 1983; Veldhuyzen & Stassen, 1977;
Wickens, 1992).
Since the process by which a team member arrives at
a prediction (e.g., anticipates a need) cannot be
observed, it has been surmised that team members
utilize an internal knowledge base, or mental model,
that helps them to decide which behaviors are
necessary,  and  when  and  how  to  perform  them.   In
other words, team theorists have taken the term
"mental model" and applied it to the understanding of
a team task, including predictions of other team
members' needs and actions.  The term "shared
mental model", then, is the extent to which individual
team members' mental models overlap--the extent to
which team members share the same understanding
of the task and the team. It is argued that the greater
degree of shared knowledge of the team, the task, and
the equipment among teammates, the better the team
will perform (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse,
1993; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1992). The
argument is that teammates with a shared
model concerning team member roles and
responsibilities can anticipate what information is
needed at what time, and deliver the information
without  further  prompting.   In  other  words,  they
achieve implicit coordination.
One early study on shared knowledge and team
performance was presented by Hemphill and Rush
(1952). They investigated the extent to which the
performance of a team or crew depended upon
individual team members’ understanding of the
duties  of  other  crew  positions.   A  crew  index  of
overlap of knowledge was found to be related to the
effectiveness of crew coordination as judged by the
crew instructor.  Minionis, Zaccaro, and Perez (1995)
examined shared knowledge among team members in
a computer simulation of a tank exercise.  The results
indicated that shared mental models enhanced
performance on collective tasks requiring
interdependence among team members but did not
impact those tasks that could be completed without
coordinated actions.
More recently, research has focused on shared mental
models and stress, situation awareness, and team
performance. Espevik, Johnsen, Eid, and Thayer
(2006) studied submarine attack crews to test whether
knowledge about team members had an effect on
performance and team processes.  They found that
knowledge about team members added to
performance, over and above the contribution from
operational skills. In addition, teams with known
team members had less physiological arousal, which
the authors attributed to the shared mental models of
team members.  Ellis (2006) examined the
mediational role of mental models and transactive
memory in the relationship between acute stress and
team performance, and found that acute stress
negatively affected mental models and transactive
memory, which helped to explain why teams
performed more poorly under acute stress.
Millward (2005) examined the effect of shared
mental models on situational awareness, or the extent
to which a person’s mental model of a given situation
accurately reflects reality, with shared situation
awareness defined as the overlap in individual
situation awareness.  The author found that groups
that implemented good communication practices
training were more likely to form high levels of
shared situation awareness and perform better than
untrained groups.
With regards to performance, Smith-Jentsch,
Mathieu, and Kraiger (2005) looked at two different
types  of  shared  mental  models,  and  found  that  they
interacted with one another to predict both tower
safety and efficiency in air traffic controllers.
Thomas and Petrilli (2006) investigated the
relationships between crew familiarity, non-technical
performance, and error management. The rate of
error occurrence was found to be higher for
unfamiliar crews.  Mathieu et al (2005) investigated
the effect of mental model quality on team
performance, and found that team processes and
performance were better among teams sharing
higher-quality team mental models than among teams
evidencing less sharedness or lower-quality models.
Similarly, Edwards, Day, Arthur, and Bell (2006)
examined the relationship between the similarity and
accuracy of team mental models and team
performance. Their results indicated that similarity
and accuracy of team mental models were
significantly related, and accuracy partially mediated
the relationship between team ability and team
performance, but similarity did not. Lim and Klein
(2006) examine the relationship between team mental
model similarity and accuracy and performance. Both
taskwork mental model and teamwork mental model
similarity predicted team performance.
Finally, Marks, Zaccaro and Mathieu (2000) and
Marks et al. (2002) found evidence that a shared
understanding of specific procedures predicted team
performance.  Thus, a growing body of evidence
indicates that the shared mental model construct
plays an important role in variety of team tasks.
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Despite this, little research on this construct has
appeared with respect to CRM.
Conclusion
As with most training methods, CRM is evolving;
recent changes include an emphasis on error
management rather than error prevention, and more
emphasis on the cognitive aspects of teamwork.  One
such  cognitive  area  that  could  be  useful  is  that  of
shared mental models.  We suggest mental models as
a useful addition to CRM both for their direct impact
on performance, but also on their indirect impact
through improving implicit communications, a
critical skill for teams operating in fast paced, high
stress environments.
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